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Summary 
This research aims to identify the incentives associated with collaterals in an asymmetric 
information context and in situations where the bank is the main financial partner of the 
entrepreneur, which is typically the case for most farms, especially in the wine sector. On the 
one hand, collaterals may reduce the risk of overinvestment by entrepreneurs and so reduce 
the risk of repayment default. On the other hand, contracting collaterals may lead the bank to 
reduce the monitoring effort. In this paper we test these two hypotheses, taking into account 
the fact that entrepreneurs can benefit from a banking relationship or not. Our results confirm 
that incentives associated with collaterals depend on bank monitoring,  and emphasize the 
uniqueness of land mortgages. Our results also confirm that the revenue constraint is binding 
and thus makes critical the question of financial resources for newly established wine farmers.  
Key-words: collaterals, incentives, bank monitoring 
JEL: G32 G33 G35 
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Like most farms, wine estates rely heavily on debt to finance their business. The contract 
between the banker and the farmer determines the latter’s ability to invest and the cash-flow 
disposal in cases of distress. One major point of this contract is the amount of collateral 
pledged to the banker by the entrepreneur. The ability to collateralize is especially high in the 
farm sector as there is a market for land as well as a resale market for machinery. This ability 
to  collateralize  may  smooth  financial  constraints  as  the  bank  can  recover  the  risk  with 
collateralization. Nonetheless, the nature and the amount of collaterals pledged to the banker 
are sharply bargained by entrepreneurs as this is a way for the banker to enforce control rights 
over “their” business. As a result, collateralization varies widely among entrepreneurs: some 
accept to pledge their lands against credit, others prefer personal guarantees, and a few obtain 
loans without having to pledge collaterals. 
The effect of collaterals on the risk taken by entrepreneurs depends on the effect of such 
collaterals  on  both  the  entrepreneur  and  the  banker.  On  the  one  hand,  in  a  context  of 
asymmetric information, collaterals may contribute to signal the less risky projects (Bester, 
1986) or lead the entrepreneur to adopt a “safe” behavior (Boot and Thakor, 1997). On the 
other  hand,  when  the  banker  reduces  asymmetric  information  with  monitoring  effort, 
collateral can lead the banker to reduce this effort (Manove, Padilla, and Pagano, 2001) and 
thus lead the banker to finance projects that are not profitable or are too risky. Following 
Manove, Padilla, and Pagano, we name this effect the lazy-bank effect. The disciplinary effect 
of collaterals is relevant in a context where the banker has no voice in the firm’s affair, i.e., 
the contract between the bank and the entrepreneur is an arm’s length contract instead of a 
lending relationship in the sense of Petersen and Rajan (1994). In this context, collaterals 
serve  to  solve  the  informational  problem.  Reversely,  the  “lazy  bank”  effect  of  Manove, 
Pagano, and Padilla (2001) exists only if the bank is expected to monitor the entrepreneur. 
Therefore, we expect that the disciplinary effect of collaterals dominates in a context of a 
weak banking relationship and that the lazy-bank effect dominates when this relationship is 
expected to be strong. Our research objective is to test these two hypotheses. One major point 
is to understand how collaterals and bank monitoring interact.    
To  achieve  this  aim,  we  focus  on  the  impact  of  collaterals,  bank  monitoring,  and  their 
interaction on two performance variables: the entrepreneurs’ revenue, or cash out, and the 
repayment delay, which is a proxy of default. These two variables play an important role in 
the bank’s point of view. Indeed, in contrast to financial statements, they are immediately 
observable and, as such, constitute early signals of financial distress. There exist different 4 
 
types of collateral. Some are linked to the firm’s assets, such as land mortgages or other 
business  collaterals  (equipment,  stock,  etc.),  while  personal  guarantees  imply  that  the 
entrepreneurs  pledge  a  part  of  their  personal  wealth.  This  distinction  is  important  as  it 
determines the incentive properties of these collaterals (Elsas and Krahnen, 2002). Our data 
give us the possibility of distinguishing the different collaterals. 
Moreover, we propose a unique proxy for the bank relationship. This proxy is based on the 
presence of financial statements in the files that the bank agents use to contract with the 
entrepreneurs. These files always include the business plan and some commentaries of the 
agent on the policy to adopt toward the entrepreneur. However, about one half of these files 
include financial statements for the period following the grant of the first credits. In our view, 
collecting and keeping financial statements may reveal the intent to monitor. As a result, we 
consider that entrepreneurs are financed through a contract with monitoring when the bank 
holds financial statements and through a contract without monitoring when the bank does not 
hold such statements. This approach of bank monitoring (or, equivalently, bank relationship) 
has  the  advantage  of  being  objective  and  of  eliminating  selection  bias  that  the  size
1,  the 
duration (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Degryse and Van Cayseele, 2000; Chakraborthy and Hu, 
2006), or declarative approach (Elsas, 2005) could imply. 
Our empirical results confirm the distinguishable incentives of collaterals according to the 
type  of  contract  linking  the  bank  and  the  entrepreneur—arm’s  length  contract  or  bank 
relationship. They highlight the uniqueness of land mortgages. Indeed, we find evidence of 
incentive properties only for this type of collateral. The significant impact of land mortgages 
on  repayment  delay  confirms  the  lazy-bank  effect.  Our  results  give  less  credit  to  the 
disciplinary effect. However, we are not sure that the lazy-bank effect and the disciplinary 
effect  are  not  together  at  work  for  entrepreneurs  who  benefit  from  a  bank  relationship. 
Moreover, the very significant effect of the revenue constraints on the level of cash out and on 
the  higher  level  of  financial  risk  highlights  the  financial  constraint  facing  the  newly 
established  wine  growers.  This  implies  a  critical  role  for  their  financing  partners  (and 
especially their bankers).  
                                                           
1 To get a precise idea between the size and the bank agents’ willingness to monitor the farm, see Gloy, 
Gunderson, and Ladue (2005). 5 
 
Our  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  We  propose  a  brief  literature  review  and  pose  the 
hypotheses in the section 1. The second section describes the data and the methodology, and 
the third section presents the results.  
 
1.  Asymmetric information and collaterals’ incentives 
a)  Collaterals’ incentives in a contract with no monitoring 
The bank financing of newly established wine farmers poses specific informational problems. 
First, the banker does not know the project quality or the entrepreneur’s ability to deal with 
the project. Lending to farmers is subsidized through very a low interest rate fixed by public 
policies. This makes a loan interesting even for bad projects. Moreover, investing in tangible 
assets is a potential way to improve the future access to finance (Almeida and Campello, 
2007). This is particularly true in the case of farms because of the high tangibility of assets 
and  the  investment  flexibility  that  Barry  (2001)  highlights.  As  a  result,  the  banker  faces 
entrepreneurs willing to benefit from favorable credit conditions and who tend to invest more 
than what is optimally required. This is a critical adverse selection problem that the banker 
can circumvent in three ways: credit rationing
2, screening, or designing contracts with proper 
incentives. For Bester (1985), collaterals provide a way for self-selection by entrepreneurs. 
Indeed, less risky entrepreneurs may be willing to signal themselves with pledging collaterals.  
Second,  moral  hazard  is  also  prevalent  through  the  entrepreneur’s  ability  either  to 
discretionarily take cash out or to overinvest. Even if debt is a specific financial contract to 
solve this problem—which is the fundamental of the financial intermediation theory as stated 
by  Diamond  (1984)—taking  out  more  cash  than  what  is  Pareto-optimal  is  potentially  a 
rational  behavior  from  entrepreneurs  that  benefit  from  an  immediate  consumption  against 
losses that they share with the banker. One second moral hazard problem is overinvestment. 
As  for  adverse  selection,  the  banker  has  three  ways  to  circumvent  moral  hazard:  credit 
rationing,  monitoring,  or  designing  contracts  with  proper  incentives.  For  Bester  (1996), 
collaterals discourage voluntary default. For Boot and Thakor (1997), collaterals are used to 
reallocate risks and so prevent overinvestment.  
b)  Bank monitoring and collaterals 
                                                           
2 See De Meza and Webb (2002). 6 
 
For Petersen and Rajan (1994), “through close and continued interaction, a firm may provide 
a lender with sufficient information about, and a voice in the firm's affairs so as to lower the 
cost and increase the availability of credit”. In this case, the bank may benefit from a good 
knowledge of the entrepreneur’s competencies, cash-flow policy, and project risks. For the 
entrepreneur, this reduces liquidity risks as the banker is able to identify the good projects. In 
other words, a strong bank relationship is expected to smooth the financial constraints. 
However,  the  bank  does  not  necessary  implement  a  relationship  because  it  implies  some 
costs
3. For the banker, there is a size effect, and so large farms are more likely than small ones 
to benefit from a relationship (Gloy, Gunderson, and Ladue, 2005). Diamond (1991) shows 
that the decision to monitor depends on the adverse selection and the moral hazard linked to 
the entrepreneur type the bank has to finance
4. Monitoring or not depends on a strategic cost-
benefits trade-off that is not easy to characterize empirically.  
The question here is how monitoring interacts  with collaterals. A  first answer is that the 
collaterals’ incentives may make monitoring useless. In this case, collaterals and monitoring 
are substitutes because collaterals incite entrepreneurs to make the best decisions. This is the 
disciplinary effect formalized by Boot and Thakor. This supposes that collaterals imply good 
performance  from  the  entrepreneurs  financed  through  a  contract  without  monitoring  (and 
eventually, contribute to the good performance from entrepreneurs financed via a lending 
relationship). 
 A second answer is that collaterals may limit banker interest in monitoring. This is the lazy-
bank effect formalized by Manove, Padilla, and Pagano (2001). This has no effect when the 
entrepreneurs are supposed to be financed with an arm’s length contract, but it can reduce the 
monitoring quality for entrepreneurs supposed to be financed via a lending relationship. In the 
latter case, collaterals may induce bad performance. 
A third answer is that collaterals may be associated with monitoring because collateralization 
is a way for bankers to grasp information on the firms. This is what Elsas (2005) and Ono and 
Uesegi  (2005)  deduce  from  their  empirical  results  in,  respectively,  the  German  and  the 
Japanese cases. An alternative explanation for this result may be that collaterals incite the 
                                                           
3 For a detailed inventory of monitoring costs, see LaDue, Gloy, and Cuykendall (2005). 
4 More specifically, he shows that the monitoring is more likely when it provides incentives to act optimally and 
is not only a screening device. 7 
 
banker to monitor, as shown by Rajan and Winton (1995). This setting does not suppose any 
relations between collaterals and performance. 
The first and the second answers imply two testable hypotheses on the collateral effect on 
performance (we will see that the third answer is useful in interpreting some results of our 
empirical findings):    
·  collaterals lead the entrepreneur to safe behavior when the bank relationship is weak, 
which is what we call the disciplinary effect of collateral; 
·  collaterals reduce the bank monitoring and thus increase the probability of financing 
risky projects when the bank relationship is strong, which is what Manove, Padilla, 
and Pagano (2001) call the lazy-bank effect. 
 
2.  Data and methodology 
a)  Data and general statistics 
We constructed a firm-level cross-section data set through a survey financed by and realized 
in  partnership  with  Crédit  Agricole,  the  main  French  agricultural  bank.  Crédit  Agricole 
wanted to obtain a picture of the financial health of the recently established wine farmers
5 to 
help  them  in  determining  their  way  of  dealing  with  these  entrepreneurs.  We  collected 
technical and economic data, projected financial statements (at the time of the settlement), 
financial statements, and bank account information on 272 newly established wine growers, 
including repayment delays and the cash flows crediting the personal bank account of the 
entrepreneurs
6. Moreover, we collected very disaggregated data on the debt contract such as 
the  purpose  of  the  loans  or  the  type  and  the  amount  of  collaterals.  Such  a  level  of 
disaggregation  is  quite  rare,  and  it  gives  us  a  unique  opportunity  to  study  the  incentive 
properties of collaterals, given that this is crucial to distinguish the effect of collaterals based 
                                                           
5 Toward this aim, we selected a sample of “Jeunes Agriculteurs,” which is a status giving the right to apply for 
investment and revenue subsidies aiming at encouraging farming. This status is granted to newly established 
farmers according to certain criteria. Our sample contains exclusively entrepreneurs with this status as this is our 
unique way of differentiating them in the bank data base. 
6 Assessing the real income of farm households is generally puzzling. Here, we observe directly the cash coming 
into the entrepreneur’s personal bank account. This separation between the personal and the professional bank 
account is a general practice whatever the legal status of the firm.  In our view, this is a way for the bank to 
monitor the amount of cash  that the entrepreneurs take out. This provides  us  with a  direct  measure of the 
farmers’ incomes. 8 
 
on assets coming from outside the firm or from inside the firm (Elsas and Krahnen, 2002). In 
our  setting  we  were  able  to  distinguish  the  land  mortgage  (inside  the  firm),  the  personal 
guarantees (outside the firm), and the pledge of equipment (inside the firm).  
The  general  picture  shows  entrepreneurs  who  rely  particularly  on  debt  to  finance  heavy 
investments. According to our data, the investment reaches 10 000 Euros per acre on average, 
with a debt of 8 000 Euros per acre and sales of 11 000 Euros per acre. This high level of 
investment  and  debt  is  explained  mainly  by  a  life  cycle  effect:  the  newly  established 
entrepreneurs modernize the farm and sometimes increase their production area. Moreover, 
investment is pushed by governmental subsidies devoted to the Jeunes Agriculteurs. The high 
level of debt may explain the relatively high level of entrepreneurs who are late in their debt 
repayment, which reaches 15%.  
The  bank  is  likely  to  make  proper  use  of  collaterals.  Sixty-seven  percent  of  the  debt  of 
entrepreneurs late in their repayment is covered, as against 55% for safe entrepreneurs. To a 
certain extent, the bank efficiently preserves its interest in limiting the Loss Given Default. 
Moreover, 29% of the bank contracts include land mortgages. Among the entrepreneurs with 
land mortgages in their contracts, 25% are in financial distress as against 12% for the others
7.  
Among the entrepreneurs with personal guarantees in their contract (60% of the population in 
our sample), 18% are in financial distress as against 12% for the others, but this difference is 
not statistically significant. It should be noted that these statistics are not sufficient to argue 
for a causality link between collaterals and risks. 
b)  The variables 
i.  Dependent variables 
As we collected our data with the bank, we focused on performance variables observed by the 
bank: the repayment delay and the entrepreneurs cash out for personal consumption. Our data 
did not enable us to take financial statement variables, because the last available financial 
statements date from one or two years before the data collection and so could immediately 
follow the entrepreneurs’ first round of investment, whereas repayment delay and cash out 
follow this time from two to seven years. This convenient choice is also coherent with our 
principal-agent approach where the banker is the principal. Indeed, Rougès (2007) shows that 
                                                           
7 The difference is statistically significant at the 1% p-value (Chi2). 9 
 
financial statements are often published too late to be a performance alert for bankers. Instead, 
the bank accounts give the first signals of financial distress. 
Repayment  delay  does  not  necessarily  mean  that  the  firm  experiences  serious  financial 
distress. However, even if the entrepreneur and the bank can quickly fix the problem with a 
renegotiation of debt, repayment delays signal that the entrepreneur does not benefit from a 
large financial slack. In this respect, the repayment delay is a relevant proxy of financial 
distress.  In our sample, 15% of the entrepreneurs show repayment delay. The entrepreneurs 
with  land  mortgages  are  more  often  in  financial  distress,  with  25%  of  them  showing 
repayment delay as against 12% for the others. The same holds for entrepreneurs with short-
term  debt,  with  32%  showing  repayment  delay.    In  the  multivariate  analysis  we  use  the 
repayment delay variable (RD), which is a binary variable equal to zero if the firm does not 
present repayment delay and one if it is the case. 
In addition to the analysis of the repayment delay, we focused on the entrepreneurs’ cash out, 
measured by the cash crediting the entrepreneur’s personal account during the year preceding 
the  data  collection.  Again,  this  does  not  provide  us  with  a  perfect  measure  of  the 
entrepreneurs’ revenue as some personal bank accounts include debt devoted to professional 
activities. Moreover, some are joint bank accounts with the life partner and so include the 
partners’ wages. We partly  control this bias in the multivariate analysis by  introducing  a 
binary variable on the fact that the partner has a salaried activity outside the farm or not. In 
addition, we are not sure that the entrepreneur does not use a part of the professional bank 
account  for  personal  consumption.  Descriptive  analysis  shows,  however,  that  the  average 
annual revenue is about 22 000 Euros (see Table 7), which corresponds to what we observe in 
French farming. We also find a very close value when we calculate the cash-flow per capita 
with the more recent financial statements. In our view, this gives credit to our measure of the 
cash out as a relevant proxy for the entrepreneur’s revenue. We name this variable CO, which 
is a continuous variable truncated at the zero-level, expressed in thousands of Euros. 
ii.  Explanatory variables 
Collaterals 
In section 1, we did not differentiate the types of collateral. However, some models deal with 
collaterals associated with assets outside the firms (Bester, 1985; or Boot and Thakor, 1994) 
and others with assets inside the firms (Rajan and Winton, 1995). As previously stated, we are 
able to distinguish personal guarantees, land mortgages, and business collaterals. This enables 10 
 
us to discuss the inside/outside dimension or the informative/not informative properties of the 
different collateral types regarding to their impact on performance. 
We name the land mortgage variable LM, which is the proportion of debt covered by land 
mortgage, and the personal guarantee PG, which is the proportion of debt covered by personal 
guarantees. We name the proportion of debt covered by equipment collaterals BC.  
The bank relationship 
In  section  1,  we  found  the  bank  relationship  to  be  somewhat  unobservable.  How  do  we 
observe the multiple interactions between the entrepreneurs and the bankers? How can we be 
sure that these interactions imply information sharing? The size of the firm provides a good 
proxy for the strength of the bank relationship. Indeed, as seen in the survey of LaDue, Gloy, 
and Cuykendall (2005), the banker is likely to invest little time in small businesses as the 
profitability  of  the  banking  relationship  is  not  necessarily  worth  it.  However,  size  is  not 
necessarily the best proxy for the strength of the bank relationship. Petersen and Rajan (1994) 
use the duration of the relationship, but the same criticism can be addressed to this proxy. 
Cole  (1998)  and  Elsas  (2005)  approach  the  bank  relationship  by  asking  directly  the 
entrepreneurs  and  the  bankers,  respectively.  This  entails  the  problem  of  the  declarative 
approach: are we sure that the entrepreneur or the banker defines the bank relationship in the 
same way that the researchers do? For example, what about a bank that tightly monitors the 
firms and is perceived as a constraint rather than a partner? Kano et al. (2010) propose a 
synthetic proxy of relationship obtained with a component analysis of the different formal 
contract and services other than debt that can relate the entrepreneurs and the bank.  
In our setting, we consider an original and unique proxy of bank relationship linked to the 
data collection process. Indeed, thanks to a partnership with the bank, we collected our data in 
the bank agencies from the file that the bank agent uses to determine his decisions on how to 
finance the entrepreneurs. About one half of these files include financial statements for the 
period following the grant of the first credits. As stated earlier, we view the collection and 
keeping  of  financial  statements  as  revealing  the  intent  to  monitor.  Thus,  we  consider 
entrepreneurs to be financed through a contract with monitoring when the bank does hold 
financial statements and through a contract without monitoring if otherwise. This original 
approach of bank monitoring (or, equivalently, bank relationship) has the advantage of being 
objective  and  does  not  imply  selection  bias.  We  name  this  variable  BM  for  “Bank 11 
 
Monitoring”. This is a binary variable equal to one if the bank holds the financial statements 
in the information file and zero if it does not. 
The collateral and monitoring interaction variable 
Section  1  showed  that  bank  contract  theorists  expect  different  effects  of  collaterals  on 
performance.  We  have  explained  some  of  these  differences  with  the  interaction  between 
collaterals and monitoring. Collateral can act as a substitute, a disincentive, or an instrument 
of monitoring. As a result, we propose to focus on the interaction between collaterals and 
monitoring: (BM*LM), (BM*PG) and (BM*BC). 
 
iii.  Control variables 
We group the control variables into three categories: the financial risk variables (FR), the 
revenue constraint variables (RC), and the context variables (CN). 
Among the financial risk variables, we distinguish the current leverage, which relates the debt 
to sales, and the credit availability, which relates the real debt to the expected debt agreed in 
the business plan at the first time of the investment
8. Highly leveraged firms are expected to 
be more risky. The case of entrepreneurs to whom the banker agrees to more credit is more 
ambiguous. Indeed, if the bank monitoring is effective, the credit availability may be linked to 
good  performance.  Therefore,  credit  availability  may  not  have  the  same  impact  for 
entrepreneurs financed via a contract with monitoring and for entrepreneurs financed through 
a contract without monitoring. The introduction of these variables as control variables should 
prevent the risk of confusing leverage effects and collateral effects on the repayment delay 
likelihood.  
The revenue constraint is a fundamental point  of the entrepreneur’s finance. Kyotaki and 
Moore (1997) demonstrate that the entrepreneur’s budget constraints may bind during the 
period of first investments. This implies that the level of the constraint, depending mainly on 
the familial situation of the entrepreneur, has a direct impact on the firm’s financial risks and 
on the investment ability. Thus, we need a proxy for personal financial needs. We take the age 
of the entrepreneur. Indeed, in our sample, most entrepreneurs are relatively poor in liquid 
capital. However, the youngest entrepreneurs often live in their parents’ home and the oldest 
                                                           
8 To a certain extent, this variable is a direct measure of ex post credit rationing, when the bank finances less than 
expected for the entrepreneur’s project. 12 
 
have often children. This age effect on the propensity to take cash out may vanish if the 
partner of the entrepreneur gets a wage from work outside the farm. Therefore, we introduce 
the binary variable named “partner wage”. Moreover, we introduce the personal debt of the 
entrepreneur, which should constraint him to take out more cash than the desirable amount. 
We expect a positive effect of the household financial needs on both cash out and repayment 
delay. 
Our economic variables encompass some variables that may have an impact on the firm’s 
performance,  such  as  the  year  of  settlement,  in  order  to  fix  the  growth  cycle  effect.  We 
present  summary  statistics  for  the  independent  variables  in  Table  1.  We  see  the  great 
variability of coverage either with land mortgages or personal guarantees through the high 
standard deviation for these two variables. Actually, these variables are often equal to zero.  
Table 1. Summary Statistics for Independent Variables  
All variables are in percentage except for age (years), personal debt (thousand euros), yield (hl per acre), and years of 
settlement (years) 
 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Collaterals  LM, Land Mortgage to total debt (%)  254  17  29 
PG, Personal Guarantees to total debt (%)   254  36  37 
BC, Business Collaterals to total debt (%)  254  13  24 
Financial 
Risks 
D, Debt to sales (%)  228  92  117 
Av, Credit availability (real to expected debt) (%)  250  97  73 
Ov, Overdraft to Sales (%)  258  3,6  5,3 
STD, Short-term debt to sales (%)  255  9,0  28,7 
Inv, Starting cash-flow to sales (%)  249  -27  49 
Revenue 
Constraint 
Age (year)  272  28  5 
PD, Personal Debt (thousand of Euros)  242  39  65 
Context  Y, Yield (hl per acre)  271  56  15 
Years, Years of settlement (years)  272  4,7  1,7 
VI, Vertical Integration   264  1,57  0,74 
 
c)  Regression equation 
Our methodology consists in the regression of cash out and repayment delay on collaterals 
and the collateral-bank relationship interaction variable.   
The regression equations take the following forms: 
RD RD RD RD
RD RD RD RD RD RD
CN RC FR
BM EC EC BM PG PG BM LM LM RD
a b b b
b b b b b b
+ + + +
+ + + + + =
9 8 7
6 5 4 3 2 1




CO CO CO CO
CO CO CO CO CO CO
CN RC FR
BM EC EC BM PG PG BM LM LM CO
a b b b
b b b b b b
+ + + +
+ + + + + =
9 8 7
6 5 4 3 2 1
          
* * *
 
According to our two assumptions, we expect that 
-  0 , , , 5 5 1 1 »
CO RD CO RD b b b b  as land mortgage is a collateral associated with assets and thus has no 
consequences on the entrepreneur’s behavior; 
-  0   ,   6 2 <
RD RD b b  and  0     , 6 2 <
CO CO b b as land mortgages may have relaxed the bank monitoring 
effort and so increase the risk of investment in a bad project;  
-  0 3 <
RD b  and  0 3 <
CO b as personal guarantees, being collateral not associated with assets, may 
imply a disciplinary effect when there is no monitoring. 
 
3.  Results 
We focus initially on the role of collaterals in repayment delay (see Table 2). The regression 
reveals no impact of collaterals when we do not consider interaction with monitoring (model 
1). When we take into account the interaction with monitoring, the variable interacting land 
mortgages and monitoring increases the risk of repayment delay, while collateral without 
monitoring  decreases  this  risk.  While  the  first  result  pleads  for  the  lazy-bank  effect,  the 
second is not expected. This contradicts the idea that land mortgages may not have an effect 
on  the  entrepreneur’s  behavior  as  they  are  backed  by  the  firm’s  assets  and  not  the 
entrepreneur’s wealth. The regression does not reveal any effect of personal guarantees and 
equipment collaterals on repayment delay. In model 3, we suppress these two variables. This 
reinforces the significance of the interaction between land mortgage and monitoring as a risk 
factor of repayment delay. As a result, the regression pleads for our second hypothesis: the 
collaterals reduce the bank monitoring and thus increase the probability of financing risky 
projects when the bank relationship is supposed to be strong.  
The control variables highlight the “obvious” role of debt and short-term debt in financial 
risks. More originally, the results show that when the banker monitors, the entrepreneurs who 
benefit from more debt relative to the debt agreed in the business plan are the less risky. In 
other words, the availability of credit reduces the default risk in the context of a lending 
relationship.   14 
 
The regression emphasizes the role of the revenue constraint. The more the entrepreneurs 
have to meet household financial needs, the riskier they are. The very significant effect of age 
is unambiguous on this point.  
Table 2: Collaterals and repayment delay 
This table shows the result of three logit regression of repayment delay, a binary variable, on collaterals. Repayment delay 
is  a  proxy  of  default.    We  proceed  in  three  steps.  First,  we  do  not  consider  the  interaction  between  collaterals  and 
monitoring. Second, we consider these interactions for all types of collaterals. Third, we eliminate personal guarantees and 
equipment collaterals that have no effect on repayment and so undermine the quality of the regression.  
 
      Repayment delay 









Focus on land 
mortgage 
Monitoring  BM  -  1.10213*  .6673997  .6475379 
Collaterals  LM  0  -.0069824  -.0359463*  -.0356076* 
LM*BM  +    .0432548*  .0445214** 
PG  -  -.0035898  -.0001221   
PG*BM  0    -.0054962   
BC  0  .2588994  -.0488894   
BC*BM  +    .919169   
Financial risks  D  +  .0066444***  .0098734***  .0098553*** 
Av*BM  -  -.0089007**  -.0108092**  -.0114321** 
STD  +  .0575761***  .0593549***  .0563981*** 
Revenue 
constraints 
Age  +  .1371577***  .1320975***  .1285807*** 
Partner Wage  -  -.4366831  -.4694889  -.4655607 
Personal debt  +  -.0004175  -.0008855  -.0007733 
Context  Size  0  .0020063*  .0022317*  .0022722** 
Years  0  .189955  .237709  .1983944 
Intercept  -7.713391***  -7.797043***  -7.511966*** 
Number of obs  205  205  205 
LR chi2  (12) 44.86  (15) 51.52  (11) 50.38 
Prob > chi2  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Pseudo R2  0.2355  0.2704  0.2644 
***, **, *  indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% test levels, respectively. 
 
Table 3 gives the result of the regression of cash out on collaterals. As shown earlier, this 
confirms  the  special  role  of  land  mortgages  and  the  non-significant  role  of  personal 
guarantees and equipment collaterals. This also shows that land mortgages have a negative 
impact on revenue for entrepreneurs financed via a contract with monitoring. In our view, this 
stems from the lack of screening linked to a project backed by land mortgages when the 
entrepreneurs are supposed to be financed via a contract with monitoring. The fact that this 
effect is linked to monitoring makes irrelevant the disciplinary effect, which may explain why 
entrepreneurs take less cash out when they have contracted collaterals. If this is the case, why 
does the effect not prevail for entrepreneurs financed through a contract without monitoring, 15 
 
unless the disciplinary effect is more effective when the entrepreneurs know they are being 
observed? 
The control variables  give interesting  results. The debt level doesn’t imply less cash out, 
while short-term debt does so very significantly. Moreover, credit availability implies higher 
cash out (see model 6) for entrepreneurs who benefit from a bank relationship. The regression 
gives prominence to the revenue constraint: the older the entrepreneurs are, the more they take 
cash out. Moreover, the outside revenue of the partner has a very significant negative impact 
on the cash out. This means that when the entrepreneurs have the choice, they don’t take cash 
out. In other words, the revenue constraint is binding. 
Finally, the repayment delay regression shows that the size of the firm increases the risk of 
repayment  delay  as  well  as  the  level  of  cash  out.  In  our  view,  this  shows  that  financial 
conditions increase with the size of the firm: the entrepreneurs benefit from a larger liquidity 
slack and the banker is ready to take more risks.   16 
 
Table 3: Collaterals and cash out 
This table shows the result of three tobit regression of cash out, a variable censored to zero, on collaterals. We use White’s 
Estimators to circumvent a slight problem of heteroskedasticity (Breush Pagan’s test). We proceed in three steps. First, we 
do not consider the interaction between collaterals and monitoring. Second, we consider these interactions for all types of 
collaterals. Third, we eliminate personal guarantees and equipment collaterals that have no effect on repayment and so 
undermine the quality of the regression.  
      Cash out 









Focus on land 
mortgage 
Monitoring  BM  +  -4.645234  5.39674  -1.548808 
Collaterals  LM  0  -.1441655  .0062609  .0120313 
LM*BM  -    -.3120492**  -.2642988** 
PG  -  -.0460935  -.0180228   
PG*BM  0    -.0602877   
BC  0  -7.690011  -.4603407   
BC*BM  -    -16.13518   
Financial risks  D  -  .0225537  .0131827  .0124162 
Av*BM  +  .0578478  .0590625  .0722357** 
STD  -  -.4453062***  -.4334899***  -.4261782*** 
Revenue 
constraints 
Age  +  1.724654***  1.915754***  1.899393*** 
Partner Wage  -  -16.27422***  -15.66612***  -15.74254*** 
Personal debt  +  .0803659**  .0802851**  .0798453** 
Context  Size  0  .0443387**  .0446997***  .0412432** 
Years  0  -.3125411  -.4708977  -.3165166 
Intercept  -23.34551  -32.20404*  -32.64715** 
Number of obs  156  156  156 
F  (12, 144) 2.28  (15,141) 2.14  (11, 145) 2.72 
Prob > F  0.0112  0.0110  0.0032 
Pseudo R2  0.0306  0.0334  0.0324 
***, **, *  indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% test levels, respectively. 
 
4.  Conclusion 
Our research shows that the effect of collaterals on performance depends on the prevalence or 
not of bank monitoring. When there is no monitoring a disciplinary effect may imply that the 
entrepreneurs take less risk when the bank contract includes collaterals. With monitoring, the 
lazy-bank effect can overcome the disciplinary effect. Our empirical test shows that the lazy-
bank  effect  is  significant  when  we  focus  on  the  interaction  between  monitoring  and  land 
mortgages. There is no such evidence for the disciplinary effect of land mortgages. Indeed, we 
see  a  negative  relationship  between  land  mortgages  and  default  risk,  but  the  result  is 
significant only at the 10% level.  
Note  that  we  interpret  the  combined  results  of  default  risk  and  low  level  of  cash  out  as 
evidence  that  risky  and  low-quality  projects  may  have  been  chosen  because  of  a  lack  of 
screening from the bank. However, a disciplinary effect could explain the low level of cash 17 
 
out. In this case, the land mortgage makes risky projects feasible because the bank knows that 
the entrepreneurs have to tightly manage their project, especially the cash flow reserve. 
In  addition,  our  analysis  confirms  that  the  revenue  constraint  of  newly  established 
entrepreneurs is binding. In other words, all of the entrepreneurs are financially constrained. 
As a result, entrepreneurs in wine estate have to expect extremely low earnings during the 
three to five years following the beginning of the project. This can explain the decreasing 
number  of  entrepreneurs  in  the  wine  sector.  For  the  main  financial  partner  of  the 
entrepreneurs in the wine sector, i.e. the bank, some solutions have to be found to solve what 
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